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Abstract
This paper is split in three parts: first, we use labelled trade data to exhibit how market
participants decisions depend on liquidity imbalance; then, we develop a stochastic control
framework where agents monitor limit orders, by exploiting liquidity imbalance, to reduce
adverse selection. For limit orders, we need optimal strategies essentially to find a balance
between fast execution and avoiding adverse selection: if the price has chances to go down
the probability to be filled is high but it is better to wait a little more to get a better
price. In a third part, we show how the added value of exploiting liquidity imbalance is
eroded by latency: being able to predict future liquidity consuming flows is of less use if
you do not have enough time to cancel and reinsert your limit orders. There is thus a
rationale for market makers to be as fast as possible to reduce adverse selection. Latency
costs of our limit order driven strategy can be measured numerically.
To authors’ knowledge this paper is the first to make the connection between empirical
evidences, a stochastic framework for limit orders including adverse selection, and the cost
of latency. Our work is a first step to shed light on the role played by latency and adverse
selection in optimal limit order placement.
1 Introduction
With the electronification, fragmentation, and increase of trading frequency, orderbook dynam-
ics is under scrutiny. Indeed, a deep understanding of orderbook dynamics provides insights
on the price formation process. There is essentially two approaches for modelling the price
formation process. First, general equilibrium models based on interactions between rational
agents who take optimal decisions. General equilibrium models focus on agents behaviours
and interactions. For example, investors split their metaorders into large collections of limit
orders (i.e. liquidity providing) and market orders (i.e. liquidity consuming) (see [Kyle, 1985],
[To´th et al., 2012], [Bacry et al., 2015]) while (high frequency) market makers mostly use limit
orders to provide liquidity to child orders of investors (see [Biais et al., 2016, ?]). Second,
statistical models where the orderbook is seen as a random process (see [Lo et al., 2002],
[Bouchaud et al., 2004], [Huang et al., 2015] and references herein). Statistical models focus
on reproducing many salient features of real markets rather than agents’ behaviours and in-
teractions. In this paper, we consider a statistical model where the arrival and cancellation
flows follow size dependent Poisson processes. Using this model, we setup an optimal control
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for one agent targeting to obtain the “best price” by maintaining optimally a limit order in the
orderbook .
In practice, market participants use optimal trading strategies to find a balance between
at least three factors: the price variation uncertainty, the market impact and the inventory
risk. For example, an asset manager who took the decision to buy or sell a large number of
shares needs to adapt its execution speed to price variations. The simplest case would be to
accelerate execution when price moves in its favor. He needs to consider the market impact
too and in particular the price pressure of large orders: fast execution of huge quantities con-
sumes orderbook liquidity and increases transaction costs. Finally, there is an inventory risk
associated to the orders size: it is riskier to hold a large position than a small one during
the same period of time. A fast execution reduces this inventory risk. The asset manager
should then find the optimal balance between trading slow and fast. Models for these strate-
gies are now well known (see [Gue´ant et al., 2013] and [Gue´ant et al., 2012] ). Recent papers
introduce a risk term in their optimisation problem. Moreover, some papers combine even
short term anticipations of price dynamics inside these risk control frameworks. For example,
in [Almgren and Lorenz, 2006], authors include a Bayesian estimator of the price trend in a
mean-variance optimal trading strategy. In [Cartea and Jaimungal, 2015], authors include an
estimate of futur liquidity consumption – µ in their paper shoud be compared to our consuming
intensities λ·,− – in macroscopic optimal execution.
In this paper, we consider an optimal control problem where the agent faces the price
variation uncertainty and the market impact but there is no inventory risk since we consider
one limit order. The idea is to propose optimal strategies that can be plugged into any large
scale strategy (see [Lehalle et al., 2013, Chapter 3] for a practitioner viewpoint on splitting the
two time scales of metaorders executions) by taking profit of a short term anticipation of price
moves.
After some considerations about short time price predictions and empirical evidences show-
ing that market participants decisions depend on the imbalance (see Section 2), we show that
optimal control can add value to any short term predictor (see Section 4) in the context of
simple control (cancel or insert a limit order) for a “large tick” stock. This result can thus be
used by investors or market makers to include some predictive power in their optimal trading
strategies.
Then we show how latency influences the efficient use of such predictions. Indeed, the added
value of the optimal control is eroded by latency. It allows us to link our work to regulatory
questions. First of all: what is the “value” of latency? Regulators could hence rely on our
results to take decisions about “slowing down” or not the market (see [Fricke and Gerig, 2014]
and [Budish et al., 2015] for discussions about this topic). It sheds also light on maker-taker
fees since the real value of limit orders (including adverse selection costs), are of importance in
this debate (see [Harris, 2013] for a discussion).
This paper can be seen as a mix of two early works presented at the “Market Microstructure:
Confronting Many Viewpoints” conference (Paris, 2014): a data-driven one focused on the pre-
dictive power of orderbooks [Sto¨ıkov, 2014], and an optimal control driven one [Moallemi, 2014].
Our added values are first a proper combination of the two aspects (inclusion of an imbalance
signal in an optimal control framework for limit orders), and then the construction of our cost
function. Unlike in the second work, we do not value a transaction with respect to the mid-
price at t = 0, but with respect to the microprice (i.e. the expected future price given the
liquidity imbalance) at t = +∞. We will argue the difference is of paramount importance since
it introduces an effect close to adverse selection aversion, that is crucial in practice.
As an introduction of our framework, we will use a database of labelled transactions on
NASDAQ OMX (the main Nordic European regulated markets) to show how orderbook imbal-
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ance is used by market participants in a way that can be seen as compatible with our theoretical
results.
Hence the structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents orderbook imbalance as a
microprice and illustrates the use of imbalance by market participants thanks to the NASDAQ
OMX database. Once these elements are in place, Section 3 presents our model and 4 shows
how to numerically solve the control problem and provides main results, especially the influence
of latency on the efficiency of the strategy.
2 Main Hypothesis and Empirical Evidences
2.1 Database presentation
The data used here are a direct feed on NASDAQ-OMX, that is the primary market1 on the
considered stock. Capital Fund Management feed recordings for AstraZeneca accounts for 72%
of market share (in traded value) for the continuous auction on this stock over the considered
period. Surprisingly, there is currently no academic paper comparing the predictive power of
imbalances of different trading venues on the same stock. It is outside of the scope of this
paper to elaborate on this. We will hence consider the liquidity on our primary market is
representative of the state of the liquidity on other “large” venues (namely Chi-X, BATS and
Turquoise on the considered stock). If it is not the case it will nevertheless not be difficult to
adapt our result relying on statistics on each venue, or on the aggregation of all venues. We
did not aggregated venues ourselves for obvious synchronization reasons: we do not know the
capability of each market participant to synchronize information coming from all venues and
do not want to add noise by making more assumptions. Our idea here is to use the state of
liquidity at the first limits on the primary market as a proxy of information about liquidity
really used by participants .
We focus on NASDAQ-OMX because this European market has an interesting property:
Venue AstraZeneca Vodafone
BATS Europe 7.16% 7.63%
Chi-X 19.27% 20.02%
Primary market 72.24% 61.09%
Turquoise 1.33% 11.26%
Table 1: Fragmentation of AstraZeneca (compared to Vodafone) from the 2013-01-02 to the
2013-09-30
market members’ identity is known. It implies transactions are labeled by the buyer’s and the
seller’s names. Almost all trading on NASDAQ Nordic stocks was labelled this way until end of
2014 (more details are available in [?], because this whole paper is based on this labelling). Note
members’ identity is not investors’ names; it is the identity of brokers or market participants
large enough to apply for a membership. High Frequency Participants (HFP) are of this kind.
Of course some participants (like large asset management institutions) use multiple brokers, or
a combination of brokers and their own membership. Nevertheless, one can expect to observe
different behaviours when members are different enough. We will here focus on three classes
of participants: High Frequency Participants (HFP), global investment banks, and regional
investment banks.
1i.e. the regulated exchange in the MiFID sense, see [Lehalle et al., 2013] for details.
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2.2 Stylized fact 1: the predictive power of the orderbook imbalance
Short term price prediction utility. Academic papers (see [Bouchaud et al., 2004] or
[Huang et al., 2015]) and brokers’ research papers (see [Besson et al., 2016]) document how
the sizes at first limits of the public orderbook2 influence the next price move. It is worthwhile
to underline that the identified effects are usually not strong enough to be the source of a
statistical arbitrage: the expected value of buying and selling back using accurate predictions
based on sizes at first limits does not beat transaction costs (bid-ask spread and fees). See
[Jaisson, 2015] for a discussion. Nevertheless:
• For an investor who already took the decision to buy or to sell, this information can spare
some basis points. For very large orders, it makes a lot of money and in any case it
reduces implicit transaction costs.
• Market makers naturally use this kind of information to add value to their trading pro-
cesses (see [Fodra and Pham, 2013] for a model supporting a theoretical optimal market
making framework including first limit prices dynamics).
The easiest way to summarize the state of the orderbook without destroying its informational
content is to compute its imbalance: the quantity at the best bid minus the one at the best ask
divided by the sum of these two quantities:
Imbt :=
QBidt −QAskt
QBidt +Q
Ask
t
. (1)
The nature of the predictive power of the imbalance. The predictive power of the
orderbook imbalance is well known (see [Lipton et al., 2013]). The rationale of this stylized
fact (i.e. the midprice will go in the direction of the smaller size of the orderbook) is outside of
the scope of this paper. We just give here some clues and intuitions to the reader:
• The future price move is positively correlated with the imbalance. In other terms
E((Pt+δt − Pt)× sign(Imbt)|Imbt) > 0,
where Pt is the midprice (i.e. Pt = (P
Bid
t +P
Ask
t )/2, where P
Bid and PAsk are respectively
the best bid ans ask prices) at t for any δt. Obviously when δt is very large, this expected
price move is very difficult to distinguish from large scale sources of uncertainty. See for
instance [Lipton et al., 2013] for details on the “predictive power” of such an indicator
(our Figure 1 illustrates this predictive power on real data).
• Within a model in which the arrival and cancellation flows follow independent point
processes of the same intensity, the smallest queue (bid or ask) will be consumed first, and
the price will be pushed in its direction. See [Huang et al., 2015] for a more sophisticated
point process-driven model and associated empirical evidences.
• Another viewpoint on imbalance would be that the bid vs. ask imbalance contains infor-
mation about the direction of the net value of investors’ metaorders : first, in a direct
way if one is convinced that investors post limit orders; second, indirectly if one believes
investors only consume liquidity and in such a case bid and ask sizes are an indicators of
market makers net inventory.
2Limit orderbooks are used in electronic market to store unmatched liquidity, the bid size is the one of
passive buyers and the ask size the one of passive sellers; see [Lehalle et al., 2013] for detailed.
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The focus of formula (1) on two first limits weaken the predictive power of the bid vs. ask
imbalance. For large tick assets3 it may be enough to just use the first limits, but for small tick
ones it certainly increases the predictive power of our imbalance indicator to take more than
one tick into account. Since a discussion on the predictive power of imbalance is outside the
scope of the paper, we will stop here the discussion.
Empirical evidences on the predictive power of the imbalance. Figure 1.a shows the
imbalance (1) on the x-axis and the midprice move after 50 trades on the y-axis. In Figure
1.a, we recover that the imbalance is highly linearly positively correlated to the price move
after 50 trades. Figure 1.b shows the distribution of imbalance just before a change in the
orderbook state. In Figure 1.b, agents are highly active at extreme imbalance values. People
become highly active at extreme imbalances because they identify a profit opportunity to catch
or at the opposite an adverse selection effect to avoid. Another explanation may come from the
predictive power of the imbalance (see Figure 1.a). In fact, participants start to anticipate the
next price move when the signal imbalance is strong while they are inactive when they have no
view on the next price move (i.e the signal imbalance is weak).
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Figure 1: (a) The predictive power of imbalance on stock Astra Zeneca: imbalance (just before
a trade) on the x-axis and the expected price move (during the next 50 trades) on the y-axis.
(b) distribution of the imbalance just before a trade. From the 2013-01-02 to the 2013-09-30
(accounts for 376,672 trades).
This paper provides a stochastic control framework to post limit orders using the information
contained in the orderbook imbalance. In such a context, we will call the microprice seen from
t and note P+∞(t):
P+∞(t) = lim
δt→+∞
E(Pt+δt|Pt, Imbt).
2.3 Stylized fact 2: Agent’s decisions depend on the orderbook liq-
uidity
2.3.1 Agent’s decisions depend on the orderbook imbalance
We expect some market participants to invest in access to data and technology to take profit of
the informational content of the orderbook imbalance. A very simple way to test this hypothesis
is to look at the orderbook imbalance just before a transaction with a limit order for a given
class of participant. We will focus on three classes of agents (i.e. market participants): Global
3For a focus on tick size, see [Dayri and Rosenbaum, 2015].
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Investment Banks, High Frequency Participants (HFP), and Regional Investment Banks or
Brokers. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on these classes of participants in the considered
database.
Order type Participant type Order side Avg. Imbalance Nbe of events
Limit Global Banks Sell 0.35 62,111
Buy -0.38 63,566
HFP Sell 0.32 52,315
Buy -0.33 46,875
Instit. Brokers Sell 0.57 6,226
Buy -0.52 4,646
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for our three classes of agent. AstraZeneca (2013-01 to 2013-09).
We focus on limit orders since information processing, strategy and latency play a more
important role for such orders than for market orders (market orders can be sent blindly, just
to finish a small metaorder or to cope with metaorders late on schedule, see [Lehalle et al., 2013]
for ellaborations on brokers’ trading strategies).
For the following charts, we use labelled transactions from NASDAQ-OMX4 and thanks to
timestamps (and matching of prices and quantities) we synchronize them with orderbook data
(recorded from direct feeds by Capital Fund Management). It enables us to snapshot the sizes
at first limits on NASDAQ-OMX just before the transaction.
Say for a given participant (i.e. agent) a the quantity at the best bid (respectively best ask)
is QBidτ (a) (resp. Q
Ask
τ (a)) just before a transaction at time τ involving a limit order owned by
a. We note Qsameτ (a) := Q
Bid
τ (a) (respectively Q
opposite
τ (a) := Q
Ask
τ (a)) for a buy limit order and
Qsameτ (a) := Q
Ask
τ (a) (respectively Q
opposite
τ (a) := Q
Bid
τ (a)) for a sell limit order.
We normalize the quantities by the best opposite to obtain ρτ (a) =
Qsameτ (a)−Qoppositeτ (a)
Qsameτ (a) +Q
opposite
τ (a)
.
It is then easy to average over the transactions indexed by timestamps τ to obtain an estimate
of this expected ratio for one class of agent:
R(a) =
1
Card(T )
∑
τ∈T
ρτ (a), lim
Card(T )→+∞
R(a) = Eτ
(
Qsameτ (a)−Qoppositeτ (a)
Qoppositeτ (a) +Q
opposite
τ (a)
)
.
It is even possible to control a potential bias by using the same number of buy and sell executed
limit orders to compute this “neutralized” average:
R′(a) =
1
Card(T (buy))
∑
τ∈T (buy)
ρτ (a) +
1
Card(T (sell))
∑
τ∈T (sell)
ρτ (a).
Figure 2.a shows the average state of the imbalance (via some estimates of R′(a), on As-
traZeneca from January 2013 to August 2013) for each class of agent (see Tables 3, 4, 5 for
lists of NASDAQ-OMX memberships used to identify agents classes). One can see the state of
the imbalance is different for each class given it “accepted” to transact via a limit order:
• Institutional brokers accept a transaction when the imbalance is largely negative, i.e.
they buy using a limit order while the price is going down. It generates a large adverse
selection: they would have wait a little more, the price would have been cheaper. They
make this choice because they do not pay enough attention to the orderbook, or because
they have to buy fast from risk management reasons on their clients’ orders.
4For each transaction, we have a buyer ID, seller ID, a size, a price and a timestamp.
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Figure 2: Comparison of neutralized orderbook Imbalance R′(a) at the time of a trade via a limit
order (a) for institutional brokers, global investment banks and High Frequency Participants.
(b) Shows a split of HFP between market makers and proprietary traders. Data are the ones
for AstraZeneca (2013-01 to 2013-09).
• High Frequency Participants (HFP) accept a transaction when the imbalance is around
one half of the one when Institutional brokers accept a trade. For sure they look more
at the orderbook state before taking a decision. Moreover they can probably be more
opportunistic: ready to wait the perfect moment instead of being lead by urgency con-
siderations.
If we split HFP between more market making-oriented ones and proprietary trading ones
on Figure 2.b we see
– market makers (probably for inventory reasons: they have to alternate buys and
sells), accept to trade when the imbalance is more negative than the average of
HFP. They are probably paid back from this adverse selection by bid-ask spread
gains (see [Menkveld, 2013]);
– proprietary traders are the most opportunistic participants of our panel, leading
them to have a less intense imbalance when they trade via limit orders: they seem
to be the ones less suffering from adverse selection.
• Global Investment banks are in between. Three reasons may explain such behaviour :
first, their activity is a mix of client execution and proprietary trading (hence we perceive
the imbalance when they accept a trade as an average of the two categories); second, they
have specific strategies to accept transactions via limit orders; third, they invest a little
less than HFP in low latency technology, but more than institutional brokers.
The main effect to note is each class of agent seems to exploit differently the state of the
orderbook before accepting or not a transaction.
2.3.2 The added value of imbalance for market participants
Now we know classes of agents take differently into account the state of orderbook imbalance
to accept or not a transaction via a limit order, one can ask what could be the value of such a
“high frequency market timing”.
We attempt to measure this value with a combination of NASDAQ-OMX labelled transac-
tions and our synchronized market data. To do this, we compute the midprice move immediately
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before and after a class of participant a accepts to transact via a limit order:
∆Pmidδt (τ, a) =
Pmidτ+δt − Pmidτ
ψ¯
· τ (a),
where τ (a) is the “sign” of the transaction (i.e. +1 for a buy and -1 for a sell) and ψ¯ is the
average bid-ask spread on the considered stock.
A “price profile5” around a trade is the averaging of this price move as a function of δt
(between -5 minutes and +5 minutes); it is an estimate of the “expected price profile” around
a trade:
pa(δt) =
1
Card(T )
∑
τ∈T
∆Pmidδt (τ, a), lim
Card(T )→+∞
pa(δt) = Eτ∆Pmidδt (τ, a).
(a) (b)
−100 0 100 200 300 400
Number of trades
−0.10
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
A
ve
ra
ge
m
id
-p
ri
ce
m
ov
e
Global Banks
Instit. Brokers
HFT
−100 0 100 200 300 400
Number of trades
−0.10
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
A
ve
ra
ge
m
id
-p
ri
ce
m
ov
e
Global Banks
Instit. Brokers
HF MM
HF Prop.
Figure 3: Midprice move relative to its position when a limit order is executed for (a) an High
Frequency Market Maker, a regional investment bank, and an institutional broker; (b) makes
the difference between HF market makers and HF proprietary traders. AstraZeneca (2013-01
to 2013-09).
Figure 3.a and 3.b show the price profiles of our three classes of participants, exhibiting real
differences beween them. First of all, it confirms the conclusions we draw from Figure 2. Since
it is always interesting to have a look at dynamical measures of liquidity (see [Lehalle, 2014]
for a defense of the use of more dynamical measures of liquidity instead of plain averages):
• It is clear that Institutional brokers (green line) are buying while the price is going down.
Would they have bought later, they would have obtained a cheaper price. As underlined
early they probably do it by purpose: they can have urgency reasons or they are using a
“trading benchmark” that does pay more attention to peg to the executed volume than
to the execution price (see [Lehalle et al., 2013, Chapter 3] for details about brokers’
benchmarks).
• We can see that the difference between High Frequency Participants (HFP) and Global
investment banks comes from the price dynamics before the trade via a limit order : for
Investment banks the price is more or less stable before the execution and goes down
when the limit order is executed. For HFP the price clearly go up before they bought with
a limit order. It implies that they inserted their limit order shortly before the trade. In
our framework we will see how cancelling and reinserting limit orders can be a way to
implement an optimal strategy.
5Note this “price profiles” are now used as a standard way to study the behaviour of high frequency traders
in academic papers, see for instance [Brogaard et al., 2012] or [Biais et al., 2016].
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• On Figure 3.b we see the difference between HF market makers and HF proprietary
traders: the latter succeed in inserting buy (resp. sell) limit orders and obtaining trans-
action while the price is clearly going up (resp. down). After the trade, one can read
a difference between them and HF market makers: proprietary traders suffer from less
adverse selection (the cyan curve is a little higher than the red one).
These charts show that there is a value in taking liquidity imbalance into account. In Section
4, we show the added of monitoring a limit order by exploiting the orderbook imbalance.
The role of latency. Without a fast enough access to the servers of exchanges, a participant
could know the best action to perform (insert or cancel a limit order), but not be able to
implement it before an unexpected transaction. Since low latency has a cost, some participants
may decide to ignore this information and do not access to fast market feeds, orderbooks states,
etc.
In the following sections we will not only provide a theoretical framework to “optimally”
exploit oderbook dynamics for limit order placement, but also study its sensitivity to latency,
showing how latency can destroy the added value of understanding orderbook dynamics.
In our theoretical framework, we can explore situations in which the participant knows the
best action but cannot implement it on time.
3 The Dynamic Programming Principle Applied to Limit
Order Placement
To setup a discrete time framework for optimal control of one limit order with imbalance, we
focus on the simple case (but complex enough in terms of modelling) of one atomic quantity q
to be executed in Tf units of time (can be orderbook events, trades, or seconds). It will be a
buy order, but it is straightforward for the reader to transpose our result for a sell order.
From zero to Tf the trader (or software) in charge of this limit order can : cancel it (i.e.
remove it from the orderbook) and insert it at the top of the bid queue (if it is not already
in the book), or do nothing. If the trader did not obtain an execution thanks to its optimal
posting policy at Tf , we force him to cancel his order (if any) and to send a market order to
obtain a trade.
For simplicity, we consider a model adapted to large tick stocks (i.e for which the spread
equals to one tick). However, our construction can be adapted to a small tick stock by enlarging
the control space. For example, we can add the possibility to post a limit order in between
the best bid and the best ask. Since we consider a small size order, sending a limit order in
between first limits highly increases the adverse selection risk. Consequently, we neglect, as a
first approximation, such a control in our model. In a more general framework, other limits
should be taken into account and more controls can be considered.
3.1 Formalisation of the Model
Let q be a small limit order inserted at the first bid limit of the orderbook. The orderbook
state is modeled by Uµt =
(
QBefore,µt , Q
After,µ
t , Q
Opp,µ
t , P
µ
t
)
whereQBefore,µ is the quantity having
priority on the order q, Q
After,µ is the quantity posted after the order q, Q
Opp,µ is the first
opposite limit quantity, P µt is the mid price and µ is the control of the agent.
For simplicity, we neglect the quantity q:
QSame,µ = QBefore,µ +QAfter,µ.
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Limit order book dynamics. Since we don’t differentiate between a cancellation and mar-
ket orders, the orderbook dynamics can be modeled by four counting processes (see Figure
4):
• NOpp,+t (respectivelyNSame,+t ) with an intensity λOpp,+(QOpp, QSame) (resp. λSame,+(QOpp, QSame))
representing the inserted orders in the opposite limit (resp. same limit).
• NOpp,−t (resp. NSame,−t ) with an intensity λOpp,−(QOpp, QSame) (resp. λSame,−(QOpp, QSame))
representing the canceled orders in the opposite limit (resp. same limit).
In this model, these four counting processes depend only on quantities at first limits. At
each event time, an atomic quantity q is added or canceled from the orderbook. Moreover, we
assume the bid-ask symmetry relation:{
λOpp,+(QOpp, QSame) = λSame,+(QSame, QOpp)
λOpp,−(QOpp, QSame) = λSame,−(QSame, QOpp).
|
Same Opp
QBefore
q
QAfter
QOpp
P (t)
Price
λSame,+
λSame,−
λOpp,+
λOpp,−
Figure 4: Diagram of flows affecting our orderbook model.
Hence, the size of the first limits can be written as long as none of them turns to be negative
: 
QOpp,µt = Q
Opp,µ
t− + q∆N
Opp,+
t − q∆NOpp,−t
QBefore,µt =
(
QBefore,µt− − q∆NSame,−t
)
1QBefore,µ
t− ≥q
QAfter,µt = Q
After,µ
t− + q∆N
Same,+
t − q10≤QBefore,µ
t− <q
∆NSame,−t .
(2)
What happens when QAfter,µ,QBefore,µ or QOpp,µ is totally consumed : First of all,
we neglect the probability that at least two of these three events happen simultaneously. When
one of the two queues fully depletes, we assume that the price moves in its direction, and we
introduce a discovered quantity QDisc to replace the deleted first queue, and an inserted quantity
QIns to be put in front of the opposite one. These quantities are random variables and their
law are conditioned by the orderbook state before the depletion. In detail:
1. When QOpp,µt = 0. The price increases by one tick (keep in mind for a buy order, the
opposite is the ask side). Then, we discover a new opposite limit and a new bid quantity
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is inserted into the bid-ask spread (on the bid side) by other market participants (see
Figure 5). It reads 
QOpp,µt = Q
Disc(QOpp,µt− , Q
Same,µ
t− )
QBefore,µt = Q
Ins(QOpp,µt− , Q
Same,µ
t− )
QAfter,µt = 0.
QDisc is the “discovered quantity” and QIns the “inserted quantity”.
|
Same Opp
QBefore
q
QAfter
QOpp
P (t) Price
λSame,+
λSame,−
λOpp,+
λOpp,−
Before price moves up
| |
Same Opp
QIns
q
QDisc
P (t) P(t)+1 Price
After price moved up
Figure 5: Diagram of a upward price change for our model.
2. When QBefore,µt = 0. The limit order is executed. This case is considered in equation 2.
3. When moreover QAfter,µt = 0. The price decreases by one tick. Then, we discover a new
quantity on the bid side and market makers insert a new quantity on the opposite side :
QOpp,µt = Q
Ins(QOpp,µt− , Q
Same,µ
t− )
QBefore,µt = Q
Disc(QOpp,µt− , Q
Same,µ
t− )
QAfter,µt = 0
If the limit order was in the orderbook: it has been executed. Otherwise the price moves
down and the trader has the opportunity to reinsert a limit order on the top of QDisc (see
Figure 6 for a diagram).
|
Same Opp
QAfter QOpp
P (t) Price
λSame,+
λSame,−
λOpp,+
λOpp,−
Before price moves down
| |
Same Opp
QDisc
QIns
P(t)-1 P(t) Price
After price moved down
Figure 6: Diagram of an downward price move in our model.
The control. We consider two types of control C = {s, c}:
• c (like continue): stay in the orderbook.
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• s (like stop): cancel the order and wait for a better orderbook state to reinsert it at the
top of Qsame (Qbid for our buy order). This control is essentially used to avoid adverse
selection, i.e. avoid to buy just before a price decrease.
Optimal control problem. We fix a finite time horizon Tf <∞ and we want to compute :
VT (0, U) = sup
µ
E
[
∆P µ∞
]
.
Where :
• U = (qbefore, qafter, qopp, p) is the initial state of the orderbook.
• T µExec = inf
{
t ≥ 0, s.t QBefore,µt < q, µt = c
} ∧ Tf represents the first execution time.
Once the order executed, the orderbook is frozen.
• ∆P µ∞ = lim
t→∞
(
P µt − PExec,µTµExec
)
represents the gain of the trader, where the execution price
PExec,µt satisfy P
Exec,µ
t = P
µ
t − 12 when the limit order is executed before Tf and PExec,µt =
P µt +
1
2
otherwise. Indeed, if at Tf the order hasn’t been executed, we cross the spread to
guarantee execution.
Choice of a benchmark. We compare the value of the obtained shares at t to its expected
value at infinity, i.e. E(P+∞(t)|Imbt) since it is not attractive to buy at the best bid if we
expect the price to continue to go down. Indeed, it is possible to expect a better future price
thanks to the observed imbalance. It thus induces an adverse selection cost in the framework.
This is not a detail since the trader will have no insentive to put a limit order at the top
of a very small queue if the opposite side of the book is large. We will see in Section 4 using
empirical evidences that this is a realistic behaviour. Such a behaviour cannot be captured by
other linear frameworks like [Moallemi, 2014].
To solve the control problem, we introduce in the next section a discrete time version of the
initial problem whose value function can be computed numerically. In this discrete framework,
lim
t→∞
(
P µt − PExec,µTµExec
)
is computed using the imbalance.
3.2 Discrete time framework
We set the time step to ∆t and the final time to Tf . Let t0 = 0 < t1 · · · tf−1 < tf = Tf different
instants at which the orderbook is observed, such that tn = n∆t for all n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f}.
Under the assumption that between two consecutive instants tn and tn+1 for all n ∈
{0, 1, · · · , f − 1}, only five cases can occur:
• 1 unit quantity is added at the bid side;
• 1 unit quantity is consumed at the bid side;
• 1 unit quantity is added at the opposite side;
• 1 unit quantity is consumed at the opposite side;
• nothing happens.
We neglect the situation where at least two cases occur during the same time interval (the
probability of such conjunctions are of the orders of λ2, hence our approximation remains valid
as far as λ2dt is small compared to λdt).
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Framework 1 (Our setup in few words.). In short, our main assumptions are:
• only one limit order of small quantity q is controlled, it is small enough to have no
influence on orderbook imbalance;
• decrease of queue sizes at first limits is caused by transactions only (i.e. no difference
between cancellation and trades);
• queues decrease or increase by one quantity only;
• the intensities of point processes (including the ones driving quantities inserted into the
bid-ask spread, and driving the quantity discovered when a second limit becomes a first
limit) are functions of the quantities at best limits only;
• no notable conjunction of multiple events.
We introduce the following Markov chain Uµn =
(
QBefore,µn , Q
After,µ
n , Q
Opp,µ
n , P
µ
n ,Execn
)
where:
• QBefore,µn is the QBefore,µ size at time tn that takes value in N.
• QAfter,µn is the QAfter,µ size at time tn that takes value in N.
• QOpp,µn is the QOpp,µ size at time tn that takes value in N.
• P µn is the mid price at time tn.
• Execn is an additional variable taking values in {−1, 0, 1}. Execn equals to 1 when the
order is executed at time tn, 0 when the order is not executed at time tn and -1 (a
“cemetery state”) when the order has been already executed before tn. We set Exec0 = 0.
In the same way, we define NSame,+n , N
Same,−
n , N
Opp,+
n and N
Opp,−
n as the values of the counting
processes NSame,+t , N
Same,−
t , N
Opp,+
t et N
Opp,−
t at time tn. The transition probabilities of the
markov chain Un are detailed in Appendix A.
The terminal constraint. The microprice P∞,k ≈ E(P∞|Fk) is defined such as:
P∞,k = F (Q
Opp
k , Q
Same
k , Pk) = Pk +
α
2
· Q
Same
k −QOppk
QOppk +Q
Same
k
∀k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f}.
Where Fk is the filtration associated to Uk such that Fk = σ (Un, n ≤ k) and α is a parameter
that represents the sensitivity of futur prices to the imbalance.
The execution price PExec,k is defined ∀k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f} such that :
PExec,k =

Pk +
1
2
when Execk = 0
Pk +
1
2
when Execk ∈ {−1, 1} andPk+1 − Pk 6= 0
Pk − 12 when Execk ∈ {−1, 1} andPk+1 − Pk = 0.
Let k0 be the execution time: k0 = inf (k ≥ 0,Execk = 1)∧ f . Then, the terminal valuation
can be written:
Zk0 = P∞,k0 − PExec,k0 (3)
Let U the set of all progressively measurable processes µ := {µk, k < f} valued in {s, c}
This problem can be written as a stochastic control problem :
VU0,f = sup
µ∈U
E
U0,µ
(Zk0) = sup
µ∈U
E
U0,µ
(
f−1∑
i=1
gi(Ui, µi) + gf (Uf )
)
.
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Where gi(Ui, µi) = Zi when Execi = 1 and µi = c and 0 otherwise for all i ∈ {1, · · · , f − 1},
and gf (Uf ) = Zf when Execf ∈ {0, 1} and 0 otherwise.
We want to compute VU0,f = sup
µ∈U
E
U0,µ
(Zk0) using dynamic programming algorithm:
{
Gf = Zf
Gn = max (P
c
nGn+1, P
s
nGn+1) ∀n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f − 1}. (4)
Where Pn represents the transition matrix of the markov chain Un.
4 A Qualitative Understanding
Equation (4) provides an explicit forward-backward algorithm that can be solved numerically:
• Step 1 Forward simulation : Starting from an initial state u, we simulate all the reachable
states during f periods.
• Step 2 Backward simulation: At the final period f , we can compute Gf for each reachable
state. Then, using the backward equation (4), we can compute, recursively, Gi knowing
Gi+1 to get G0.
In this section, we present and comment the simulation results. For more details about the
forward-backward algorithm see Appendix A.
We are going to compare two situations:
• The first one called (NC) corresponds to the case when no control is adopted (i.e we
always stay in the orderbook and “join the best bid” each time it changes).
• The second one called (OC) corresponds to the optimal control case: controls ”c” and
”s” are considered.
Moreover, our simulation results are given for two different cases :
• Framework (CONST): intensities of insertion and cancellation are constant: λSame,+k =
λOpp,+k = 0.06 and λ
Same,−
k = λ
Opp,−
k = 0.5 ∀k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f}. Under (CONST), the
inserted quantities QIns and discovered quantities QDisc are constant too.
• Framework (IMB): intensities of cancellation and insertion are functions of the imbal-
ance such as ∀k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f} :
λOpp,+k
(
QOppk , Q
Same
k
)
= λSame,+k
(
QSamek , Q
Opp
k
)
= λ+0 + β
+ Q
Opp
k
(QOppk +Q
Same
k )
λOpp,−k
(
QOppk , Q
Same
k
)
= λSame,−k
(
QSamek , Q
Opp
k
)
= λ−0 + β
− QSamek
(QOppk +Q
Same
k )
Where λ±0 are basic insertion and cancellation intensties and β
± are predictability param-
eters representing the sensitivity of order flows to the imbalance.
Moreover, under (IMB), inserted and discovered quantities are computed in the following
way:
– When QOppk is totally consumed, we set Q
Disc
k = dqdisc0 + θdisc · QSamek e and
QIns = dqins0 + θins · QSamek e. Where θdisc and θins are coefficients associated to
liquidity and d.e is the upper rounding. qdisc0 and qins0 are the basic discovered and
inserted quantities.
14
– Similarly when QSamek is totally consumed, we set Q
Disc = dqdisc0 + θdisc · QOppk e
and QIns = dqins0 + θins ·QOppk e.
This kind of relations is compatible with empirical findings of [Huang et al., 2015] and different
from [Cont and De Larrard, 2013] in which QDisc = QIns is independant of liquidity imbalance.
4.1 Numerically Solving the Control Problem
4.1.1 Anticipation of Adverse Selection
The cancellation is used by the optimal strategy to avoid adverse selection. For instance,
when the quantity on the same side is extremely lower than the one on the opposite side, it is
expected to cancel the order to wait for a better future opportunity. The optimal control takes
in consideration this effect and cancels the order when such a high adverse selection effect is
present.
We keep notations of Section 3. Let µ := {µk, k < f} a control, we define EU0,µ (∆P|Exec) =
EU0,µ (Zk0). EU0,µ (∆P|Exec) depends on the control µ, the initial state of the orderbook U0 and
the terminal period f . The quantity EU0,µ (∆P|Exec) can be directly computed by a forward
algorithm that visits all the possible states of the markov chain Uµn . For more details about the
transition probabilities of the Markov chain Uµn see Appendix A.
The quantity EU0,µ (∆P|Exec) is interesting since it corresponds to the quantity to maximize
in our optimal control problem and it represents as well the profitability/trade of an agent.
Let µc the control where the agent always stays in the orderbook (i.e NC) and µ∗ the
optimal control (i.e OC). The Figure 7.a represents the variation of EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec) and
EU0,µc (∆P|Exec) when the initial imbalance of the orderbook moves under (CONST). In Figure
7.a, blue points are initial states where it is optimal to stay in the orderbook since the beginning
(i.e t = 0) while red points are initial states where it is optimal to cancel the order at t = 0.
Initial parameters are fixed such that λSame,+ = λOpp,+ = 0.06, λSame,− = λOpp,− = 0.5, α = 4,
QDisc = 6, QIns = 4, f = 20, q = 1 and P0 = 10. Moreover, initial imbalance values are
obtained by varying QOpp0 from 2 to 12 and Q
After
0 from 1 to 11 while Q
Before
0 is kept constant
equal to 1.
Figure 7.b is the analogous of Figure 7.a but under the framework (IMB). In Figure 7.b,
initial parameters are fixed such that λ+0 = 0.06, λ
−
0 = 0.5, β
+ = 0.075, β− = 0.25, qdisc0 = 6,
qins0 = 2, θdisc = 3, θdisc = 0.5, α = 4, f = 20 and P0 = 10. Similarly, initial imbalance
values are obtained by varying QOpp0 from 2 to 12 and Q
After
0 from 1 to 11 while Q
Before
0 is kept
constant equal to 1.
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Figure 7: (a) (resp. (b)) EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec) and EU0,µc (∆P|Exec) when intensities are constant
(CONST) (resp . (IMB)).
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The main effect to note on these curves is the way the optimal control anticipates adverse
selection. When imbalance is highly negative, we cancel first the order (red points) to take
advantage from a better futur opportunity. We notice that under the framework (IMB), the
agent cancels earlier than under the framework (CONST) since more weights are given to
cancellation events. This point is detailed in **.
Appendix C explains the downward slopes at the left of Figures 7.a and 7.b.
4.1.2 Price Improvement comes from avoiding adverse selection
As expected, results obtained in the optimal control (OC) case are better than the ones in the
non-controlled (NC) case : by cancelling and taking into account liquidity imbalance, one can
be more efficient than just staying in the orderbook.
Figure 8.a shows the variation of the price improvement (resp. EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec)−EU0,µc (∆P|Exec))
when the initial imbalance moves, under both frameworks (CONST) and (IMB). We kept the
same initial parameters of Figures 7.a and 7.b.
Similarly, Figure 8.b represents the variation EU0,µ∗ (Pk0|Exec)−EU0,µc (Pk0|Exec) when the
initial imbalance moves, under both frameworks (CONST) and (IMB). Pk0 is the mid price at
the execution time k0. We kept the same initial parameters of Figures 7.a and 7.b.
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Figure 8: (a) EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec) − EU0,µc (∆P|Exec) move relative to initial imbalance under
(CONST) and (IMB). (b) EU0,µ∗ (Pk0|Exec)−EU0,µc (Pk0|Exec) move relative to initial imbalance
move relative to initial imbalance under (CONST) and (IMB).
Figure 8 deserves the following comments. As expected, the optimal control provides better
results than a blind “join the bid” strategy. In Figure 8.a the price improvement is non-
negative since our control maximizes EU0,µ (∆P). When the initial imbalance is highly positive,
the price improvement is close to 0 however when the initial imbalance is highly negative the
price improvement becomes higher than 0 by avoiding adverse selection. Similarly, Figure 8.b
shows that the optimal strategy allows to buy with a low average price when imbalance is highly
negative by preventing from adverse selection 6.
4.1.3 Average Duration of Optimal Strategies
In brief, the optimal strategy aims to obtain an execution in the best market conditions (i.e.
with a low adverse selection risk). It can be read on the average lifetime (i.e. ”duration”) of
the strategy. Figure 9.a compares the average strategy duration in both frameworks (NC) and
(OC) when intensities are constant (CONST). We kept the same initial parameters of Figure
7.a. Figure 9.b is the analogous of Figure 9.a but under framework (IMB). Finally, Figure 9.c
6Indirectly, maximizing EU0,µ (∆P|Exec) leads to the minimization of the price.
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shows the ”stay ratio” (i.e. the proportion of trajectories for which the optimal strategy chooses
to not cancel its limit order) under both frameworks (NC) and (OC) when intensities depend
on the imbalance (IMB). Figure 9.b and 9.c are computed with the same initial parameters of
Figure 7.b.
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Figure 9: Average strategy duration as a function of (a) the initial imbalance under (CONST)
and (b) the initial imbalance under (IMB). (c) Stay ratio as a function of the initial imbalance
under (IMB).
In both Figures 9.a and 9.b, the average strategy duration of the optimal control is always
higher than the non-optimal one. It is an expected result since the optimal control cancels the
order and hence postpone the execution. Moreover, the algorithm cancels the order when high
adverse selection is present (i.e the imbalance is highly negative under IMB 7). In such case,
the average strategy duration of the optimal control is strictly greater than the non-optimal
one (see Figures 9.a and 9.b).
** In Figure 9.b, when intensities depend on the imbalance (IMB), the average strategy
duration has an increasing trend. In fact, under (IMB), when imbalance is highly positive,
more weights are given to events delaying the execution. For example, when imbalance is
highly positive, the bid queue is a way larger than the opposite one. Then, the probability to
obtain an execution on the bid side is low : that’s why it is expected to wait more. Moreover,
Figure 9.c shows that the agent become more active when high adverse selection is present.
Indeed, when the imbalance is negative (i.e. high adverse selection), the ”stay ratio” decreases
and consequently the ”cancel ratio” increases.
7 close to t = 0, the optimal strategy is free to cancel its limit order; but when Tf is close, it has to think
about the cost of having to cross the spread in few steps.
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4.1.4 Influence of the Terminal Constraint
In this section, we want to shed light on two stylized facts:
1. the optimal strategy performs better under good market condition when there is more
time left.
2. the optimal strategy becomes highly active close to the terminal time.
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Figure 10: (a) EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec) move relative to remaining time under (CONST) and (IMB).
(b) stay cancel ratio move relative to remaining time to maturity under (IMB).
Figure 10.a compares the variation of EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec) as a function of the remaining time
under frameworks (CONST) and (IMB). Initial imbalance is fixed equal to 0.5. Thanks to
the Figure 10.a, we can see that the more time remaining, the better for the optimal strategy.
However, the concavity of the curve shows that the marginal performance
∂E(∆P)t
∂t
is decreasing.
Moreover, Figure 10.a shows also that EU0,µ∗ (∆P|Exec) may converge to a limit value when
maturity time tends to infinity. Since the markov chain Un is ergodic (cf. [Huang et al., 2015]),
we believe that this limit value is unique and independent of the initial state of the orderbook
and could lead to an “almost ergodic” regime.
In Figure 10.b, we represent the percentage of times where the optimal strategy cancels its
order and the percentage of times where it decides to stay in the orderbook as a function of
remaining time under (CONST) and (IMB). The initial imbalance is fixed to 0.5. Thanks to
Figure 10.b, we conclude that it is optimal to be more active close to t = Tf . In Figures 10.a
and 10.b, we kept the same initial parameters of Figures 7.a and 7.b
4.2 The Price of Latency
In Section 3, we defined the Markov chain Uµn that corresponds to a market participant enabled
to change his control at each period. A slower participant will not react at each limit orderbook
move. Hence, he can be modelled by the markov chain Uµτn where τ corresponds to a latency
factor such as τ ∈ N∗.
Using notations of previous sections, we define Zτ,f as the final constraint associated to the
Markov chain Uµτn. Thus, we define the latency cost of a participant with a latency factor τ
such as :
LatencyU0,f (τ) = VU0,f − VU0,f,τ ∀τ ∈ N∗ (5)
Where VU0,f,τ = sup
µ∈U
EU0,µ (Zτ,f ).
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By adapting the same numerical forward-backward algorithm, the cost of latency can be
computed numerically. This cost can be converted into a value: it is the value a trader should
accept to pay in technology since he will be rewarded in term of performance.
Figures 11.a and 11.b show the variation of the latency cost with respect to the latency
factor τ under both frameworks (CONST) and (IMB) for different values of α. The initial
imbalance is fixed equal to 0.5 with an initial state QAfter0 = 2,Q
Before
0 = 1 and Q
Opp
0 = 1. We
kept the same initial parameters of Figure 7.a and Figure 7.b.
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Figure 11: (a) Latency cost as a function of the latency factor τ under (CONST). (b) Latency
cost as a function of the latency factor τ under (IMB) for different values of α.
Numerical results show :
• The latency cost increases with the latency factor τ (cf. Figure 11.a).
• The latency cost is higher when sensitivity to adverse selection increases (i.e α is big) (cf.
Figures 11.a and 11.b).
Consequently, the added value of exploiting a knowledge on liquidity imbalance is eroded
by latency: being able to predict future liquidity consuming flows is of less use if you can’t
cancel and reinsert your limit orders at each change of the orderbook state. For instance, when
two agents act optimally according the same criterion, the faster will have more profits than
the slower.
5 Conclusion
We have used NASDAQ-OMX labelled data to show how market participants accept or refuse
transactions via limit orders as a function of liquidity imbalance. It is not an exhaustive study
on this exchange from the north of Europe (we focus on AstraZeneca from January 2013 to
September 2013). We first show that the orderbook imbalance has a predictive power on future
mid price move. We then focus on three types of market participants: Institutional brokers,
Global Investment Banks (GIB) and High Frequency Participants (HFP). Data show that the
former accept to trade when the imbalance is more negative (i.e. they buy or sell while the price
pressure is downward or upward) than GIB, themselves accepting a more negative imbalance
than HFP. Moreover, when we split HFP between high frequency market makers and high
frequency proprietary traders (HFPT), we see that HFPT achieve to buy via limit orders when
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the imbalance is very small. We complete this analysis with the dynamics of prices around
limit orders execution, showing how strategically participants use their limit orders.
Then we proposed a theoretical framework to control limit orders where liquidity imbal-
ance can be used to predict future price moves. Our framework includes potential adverse
selection via a parameter α. We use the dynamic programming principle to provide a way to
solve it numerically and exhibit simulations. We show that solutions of our framework have
commonalities with our empirical findings.
In a last Section we show how the capability of exploiting imbalance predictability using
optimal control decreases with latency: the trader has less time to put in place sophisticated
strategies, hence he cannot take profit of any strategy gain.
The difficult point of using limit orders is adverse selection: if the price has chances to go
down the probability to be filled is high but it is better to postpone execution to get a better
price. However, when a market participant cancels his limit order (to postpone execution), he
takes the risk to never obtain a transaction: the reinsertion of the order will be on the top of
the bid queue. Furthermore, the price may go up again before the execution of the limit order.
Our framework includes all these effects and our optimal strategy makes the choice between
waiting in the queue or leaving it when the probability the price will go down is too high. To
do this, the position of the limit order in the queue is taken into account by our controller.
This leads to a quantitative way to understand market making and latency: if a market
maker is fast enough, he will be able to play this insert, cancel and re-insert game to react
to his observations of liquidity imbalance. In our framework we use the difference between
the sizes of the first bid and ask queues as a proxy of liquidity imbalance, in the real word
market participants can use a lot of other information (like liquidity imbalance on correlated
instruments, or realtime news feeds).
In such a context speed can be seen as a protection to adverse selection, potentially reducing
transaction costs. Within this viewpoint, high frequency actions do not add noise to the price
formation process (as opposite to the viewpoint of [Budish et al., 2015]) but allows market
makers to offer better quotes. At this stage, we do not conclude speed is good for liquidity
because:
• We only focussed on one limit order, we should go towards a framework similar to the
one of [Gue´ant et al., 2013] to conclude on the added value of imbalance for the whole
market making process, but it will be too sophisticated at this stage.
• It is not fair to draw conclusions from a knowledge of the theoretical optimal behaviour
of one market participant; to go further we should model the game played by all par-
ticipants, similarly to what have been done in [Lachapelle et al., 2016]. Again it is a
very sophisticated work. Nevertheless, this paper is a first step. We are convinced it is
possible to obtain partially explicit formula, to enable more systematic explorations of
the influence of parameters (currently our simulations are highly memory consuming). It
should allow to confront our results to observed behaviors with accuracy (especially using
observed values for our parameters α, β,QDisc, QIns and λs).
• Last but not least, any conclusion on the added value of low latency and high frequency
market making should take into account market conditions. Its value could change with
the level of stress of the price formation.
This work shows that imbalance is used by participants, and provides a theoretical framework
to play with limit order placement. It can be used by practitioners. More importantly, we
hope other researchers will extend our work in different directions to answer to more questions,
and we will ourselves continue to work further to understand better liquidity formation at the
smallest time scales thanks to this new framework.
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A Transition probabilities of the markov chain Un
When first limits are totally consumed, new quantities QDiscn and Q
Ins
n are inserted in the
orderbook. We introduce then φn the joint distribution of the random variables Q
Disc
n et Q
Ins
n
at time tn. We assume these two variables are independent from their past and independent
from the counting processes NSame,+, NSame,−, NOpp,− and NOpp,+. However, QDiscn and Q
Ins
n
can be correlated at time tn.
Let n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , f}, p ∈ R+, qbef ∈ N, qaft ∈ N, qopp ∈ N, qdisc ∈ N, qins ∈ N and
e ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
• When the order has been executed before tn (i.e e = 1 or e = −1),then :
P
(
Un+1 = (p, q
bef , qaft, qopp,−1)/Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= 1.
When the order is executed a dead center is reached and both quantities and the price
remain unchanged. In such case, the control has no more infuence.
• When the order isn’t executed at tn (i.e e = 0), and :
A unit quantity is added to QOpp. Under control ”c”, the transition probability is
the following :
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p, q
bef , qaft, (qopp + 1) , e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= P(
{
NOpp,+n+1 −NOpp,+n = 1
}
∩
{
NOpp,−n+1 −NOpp,−n = 0
}
∩
{
NSame,+n+1 −NSame,+n = 0
}
∩
{
NSame,−n+1 −NSame,−n = 0
}
)
= λOpp,+n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
Under control ”s” :
P(s)
(
Un+1 = (p,
(
qbef + qaft
)
, 0, (qopp + 1) , e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λOpp,+n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
A unit quantity is cancelled from QOpp. We differentiate between two cases:
1. When qopp > 1, under control ”c” :
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p, q
bef , qaft, (qopp − 1) , e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= P(
{
NOpp,+n+1 −NOpp,+n = 0
}
∩
{
NOpp,−n+1 −NOpp,−n = 1
}
∩
{
NSame,+n+1 −NSame,+n = 0
}
∩
{
NSame,−n+1 −NSame,−n = 0
}
)
= λOpp,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
Under control ”s”:
P(s)
(
Un+1 = (p,
(
qbef + qaft
)
, 0, (qopp − 1) , e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λOpp,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
2. When qopp ≤ 1, the price increases by one tick under control ’c’ :
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p+ 1, q
ins, 0, qdisc, e) | Un = (p, qbef , qaft, 1, e)
)
= λOpp,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
φn+1(q
disc, qins).
Under control ”s”, the last formula does not change.
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A unit quantity is added to QSame , under control ”c” we have :
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p, q
bef , qaft + 1, qopp, e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λSame,+n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
)
.
Under control ”s”:
P(s)
(
Un+1 = (p,
(
qbef + qaft + 1
)
, 0, qopp, e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λSame,+n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,−n ∆t
)
.
A unit quantity is cancelled from QSame. We distinguish again three cases :
1. When
(
qbef > 1 and qaft ≥ 0) or (qbef = 1 and qaft ≥ 1), under control ”c”:
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p, q
bef − 1, qaft, qopp, e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λSame,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
We suppose that our order is executed when QAftern is consumed. Under control ”s”:
P(s)
(
Un+1 = (p,
(
qbef + qaft − 1), 0, qopp, e)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e))
= λSame,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
2. When qbef = 0 and qaft > 1, under control ”c”:
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p, 0,
(
qaft − 1) , qopp, 1)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e))
= λSame,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
Under control ”s”:
P(s)
(
Un+1 = (p,
(
qaft − 1) , 0, qopp, 0)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e))
= λSame,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
3. When qbef + qaft = 1, under control ”c” :
P(c)
(
Un+1 = (p, q
disc, 0, qins, 1)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λSame,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
φn+1(q
disc, qins).
Under control ”s”:
P(s)
(
Un+1 = (p, q
disc, 0, qins, 0)|Un = (p, qbef , qaft, qopp, e)
)
= λSame,−n ∆t
(
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
φn+1(q
disc, qins).
Nothing happens in the limit order book with probability
P(c)
(
Un+1 = Un|Un
)
=
(
1− λSame,−n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,+n ∆t
) (
1− λOpp,−n ∆t
) (
1− λSame,+n ∆t
)
.
• For all the remaining cases we assume the transition probability neglectibe. We hence set
it to zero.
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Remark. By taking in consideration the different cases and neglecting the terms with
order strictly superior than 1 in ∆t, we have for any control i ∈ {c, s}:∑
statesUn
statesUn+1
∫
(N+)2
P(i)(Un+1|Un) µn+1(d qdisc, d qins)
≈ 1 + λSame,+n ∆t + λSame,−n ∆t + λOpp,+n ∆t + λOpp,−n ∆t.
Consequently, if λSame,+n ∆t + λ
Same,−
n ∆t + λ
Opp,+
n ∆t + λ
Opp,−
n ∆t = o(1) ( which is true when ∆t
is small), we end up with for any control i ∈ {c, s}:∑
statesUn
statesUn+1
∫
(N+)2
P(i)(Un+1/Un)φn+1(d qdisc, d qins) ≈ 1.
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B Composition of market participants groups
High Fequency Traders
Name NASADQ-OMX Market Prop.
member code(s) Maker Trader
All Options International B.V. AOI
Hardcastle Trading AG HCT
IMC Trading B.V IMC, IMA Yes
KCG Europe Limited KEM, GEL Yes
MMX Trading B.V MMX
Nyenburgh Holding B.V. NYE
Optiver VOF OPV Yes
Spire Europe Limited SRE, SREA, SREB Yes
SSW-Trading GmbH IAT
WEBB Traders B.V WEB
Wolverine Trading UK Ltd WLV
Table 3: Composition of the group of HFT used for empirical examples, and the composition
of our “high frequency market maker” and “high frequency proprietary traders” subgroups.
Global Investment Banks
Name NASADQ-OMX
member code(s)
Barclays Capital Securities Limited Plc BRC
Citigroup Global Markets Limited SAB
Commerzbank AG CBK
Deutsche Bank AG DBL
HSBC Bank plc HBC
Merrill Lynch International MLI
Nomura International plc NIP
Table 4: Composition of the group of Global Investment Banks used for empirical examples.
Institutional Brokers
Name NASADQ-OMX
member code(s)
ABG Sundal Collier ASA ABC
Citadel Securities (Europe) Limited CDG
Erik Penser Bankaktiebolag EPB
Jefferies International Limited JEF
Neonet Securities AB NEO
Remium Nordic AB REM
Timber Hill Europe AG TMB
Table 5: Composition of the group of Institutional Brokers used for empirical examples.
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C Extreme Imbalances
The decreasing slope at the right of the curve in Figure 7.a and 7.b when imbalance is
highly positive (i.e QSame  QOpp ≈ 1 ). In this situation, the order will be executed in general
before the final time Tf without being followed by a price move (1) or will be executed at Tf
and followed by a price move (2). In both cases, the final constraint ∆P is positive (see graph
12). Given that ∆P in case (2) is lower than ∆P in case (1) and situation (2) occurs more
frequently when imbalance is highly positive, it is expected to find a decreasing slope at the
right of the curve.
|q
QAfter
QSame
Same Opp PriceP (t)
PExec P∞∆P > 0
if order executed before Tf (1)
| |
P (t)
PExec P∞
∆P > 0
Same Opp
QDisc
QIns
QOpp
QAfter
q
Price
if order executed at Tf (2)
Figure 12: ∆P when Imbalance highly positive
The linear increasing trend of the curve can also be explained by the expression of ∆P =
±0.5 + α
2
× Imb especially when the imbalance effect is not significant (far from the extreme
points). The linear increasing trend of the curve is coherent with the empirical result in Figure
1.
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